Section I: SITREP - Iraq's militias and armed groups
1.1 Overview: Iraq’s current security landscape
Prevalence of armed groups and militias
Iraq’s security situation remains fragile. There have been marked decreases in sectarian
violence and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)-led insurgent activity since the early-2007 United
States’ troop surge, the so called Anbar awakening and the subsequent mobilisation of
Sunni militias in Concerned Local Citizens groups. However, Iraq’s security landscape
remains characterised by a number of deep fault lines, the most potentially explosive of
which include Shia groups’ dominance of Iraq’s security forces;7 the need to fulfil the
expectations aroused by the US’ mobilisation of Sunni Sons of Iraq groups;8 and the
increasingly inexorable movement of Shia splinter militia groups towards Iranian influence.
Avoiding the sectarian security trap
The recent growth of Concerned Local Citizen groups from Sunni areas to include the
predominantly Shia regions of Iraq is a positive step towards the provision of pan-sectarian
security. Indeed, bridging the sectarian security divide is a necessary step to help the US
avoid the situation where they are paying, fighting, and dying to build a severely flawed
democracy.
The need for non-sectarian democracy-supporting security initiatives
Anchoring democracy in Iraq will require the sustainable security that can only be
guaranteed through the active participation of Iraqis at all levels of society. As well as topdown
security initiatives which focus on defeating the country’s armed groups and militias,
counter-insurgency efforts in Iraq must ‘sell’ democracy to ordinary Iraqis, by meeting their
security needs. To build a real democracy in Iraq, US security efforts in the country should
support grassroots micro-security initiatives, centred in local communities, and which focus
on addressing the grievances that prompt angry young men to take up arms.
1.2 Differentiating Iraq’s militias and armed groups
Militias and armed groups operating in Iraq can be classified by ethno-sectarian makeup, membership size, association with political parties,
areas of operation, opponents, level of support for the Iraqi government and/or the United States’ military presence in Iraq, and operational
support from either the United States or Iran.
Al Qaeda in Iraq: down and shifting around, but not out
“Al Qaeda is a menace to society.”
Student, 23
Baghdad, May 2008
Although Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is suffering from sustained attacks to its leadership and
diminishing appeal amongst local Sunni communities, and could not, in its present
condition, overthrow the national government in Iraq and seize control of the state, time
and again, AQI has demonstrated its capacity to adapt.
As well as attacking Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces, AQI is now focusing on counter-
“collaboration” operations. Suicide bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations against
provincial officials and Awakening and Concerned Local Citizens leaders have become key
AQI activities.
1.3 Neutralising terror in Iraq: isolate extremists and implement microsecurity initiatives
Build on current small security successes to enable grassroots micro-security initiatives
The relative calm afforded by the mid-2007 surge of US troops in Iraq provides an
opportunity for the Coalition to support the development of democracy in Iraq by
cementing the positive effects of recent security developments such as the co-opting of
local groups in security management and the ongoing evolution of the Concerned Local
Citizens across sectarian lines. However, caution must be exercised to ensure that the
inclusion of local groups in the provision of security does not equate to (and is not
perceived by Iraqis as equating to) international support for sectarian divisions within
Iraq’s institutions, because such divisions directly contradict the basic democratic
principles that must be embedded within the country’s structures and institutions of
governance.
There now exists an opportunity to break down sectarian militia blocs into individual
groups, and in doing so, create the space to implement the grassroots micro-security
initiatives necessary to neutralise mechanisms of self-sustaining internal violence, and to
draw Iraq’s various communities back together again. Isolating and defeating the most
extreme armed groups and militias will enable the Coalition to devote energy and resources
to securing the development of the small-medium enterprises in Iraq communities that will
provide jobs for young Iraqi men who would otherwise seek work with militias.
“Unemployed people join the militias for the money.”
Unemployed, 20
Baghdad, May 2008
Divide to conquer Iraq’s militias and armed groups
The armed groups and militias currently operating in Iraq can be classified into three main
layers, divided according to level of affiliation with members of the Iraqi government and
its security forces, the United States military, or the Iranian security forces. Each tier is
further divided by ethno-sectarian leanings. Although some groups remain militantly
opposed to both the Shia-dominated Iraq government and its US supporters, many groups
are either directly affiliated with political parties within the current Iraq parliament (those
groups in the green zone of the following diagram), or have begun to demonstrate a willingness
to enhance their legitimacy by operating within Iraq’s existing formal political structures.
As such, the current configuration of Iraq’s militias and armed groups represents an
important opportunity for the Iraq government and its allies to stabilise the country’s
security and political landscapes. Positive engagement with middle layer (orange) armed
groups could provide the political space within which to conduct the targeted counterinsurgency
and counter-terrorist efforts against the (red) most violent of the Iran-backed
Shia “special groups” militias, former Baathist Regime elements, and Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Why reach out to mid-level armed groups now?
Currently, the mid-layer groups remain somewhat homogenous and the leaders (where they
exist) continue to have some measure of control over, or at least access to, the most
extreme elements of the groups. However, this situation is unlikely to remain static.
Iran is actively courting the more extreme elements of al-Sadr’s Jaish al Mahdi group as a
hedge against the potential political failure of its current ally SIIC. It could prove
extremely difficult to reach out to these groups once they are under Iran control –
particularly if the United States maintains its stance of ignoring Iran.
“Iran and the USA are the cause of all of Iraq’s problems.”
Student
Baghdad, May 2008
In addition, US domestic pressure is mounting over the spiralling cost of the Iraq war, and
it is likely that continuing to fund the Sons of Iraq/Concerned Local Citizens groups is
unsustainable for the United States even in the medium term. However, a failure by the
US to balance any cut in funding with sustainable livelihood opportunities could be
perceived as a broken promise, and the resulting disillusionment could result in Sunni
armed groups turning back to Al Qaeda in Iraq or disruptive criminal activity like drug
smuggling.
1.4 Most wanted: grassroots micro-security initiatives
Like the ongoing binary debate about whether the US should stay in Iraq or pull its troops
out as soon as possible, the current focus on defeating Iraq’s militias and armed groups
through military means alone is too one-sided to ensure sustainable security. While
isolating Iraq’s extremist groups and politically accommodating groups representing
legitimate political grievances are important and necessary steps in the security continuum,
a third step is also needed: grassroots micro-security initiatives.
“Unemployment is like a disease, it will kill the people.”
Student, 21
Baghdad, May 2008
Currently, Iraq is overrun by disenfranchised groups of unemployed youths who,
disillusioned with the benefits that democracy has supposedly brought to Iraq, have taken
up arms and joined militias and armed groups. However, an examination of these angry
young men’s grievances indicates that if these problems were addressed, it is likely that the
vast majority could be won over, disarmed, and motivated to contribute to developing
Iraq’s democracy. As such, the widespread unemployment and the lack of development in
Iraq are real and pressing security concerns, which must be urgently tackled.
Borrowing from best practices in the development concept of micro-credit, micro-security
initiatives, such as the germination of localised, Iraq-branded small to medium sized
enterprises which employ individuals and address macro-level goals of development and
employment within individual Iraqi communities represent the best opportunity for the
international to consolidate Iraq’s fragile democracy.
1.5 Drug trafficking: international criminals capitalising on Iraq’s
insecurity
“Security is fragile, and criminals are taking advantage of it to weaken the government.”
Security guard
Baghdad, May 2008
Increasing involvement in drug smuggling and criminal activities
A number of Iraq’s armed groups and militias are capitalising on the ongoing low levels of
security and the extremely limited state presence in many regions to increase their funding
opportunities through involvement in international drug smuggling and local opium
production. Field research indicates that Iraqis believe that criminals are taking advantage
of the current security environment, and that the country is currently experiencing an
increase in drug cultivation and trafficking.
International drug monitoring bodies fear that drug trafficking and drug production are
growing problems in Iraq. Like Afghanistan, the organised trafficking of drugs is becoming
increasingly linked with insurgent groups and local power holders, and it has been
reported that Al Qaeda in Iraq’s participation in the production and trade of drugs in Iraq is
well-established. In recent years, the southern region of Iraq has operated as a hub for
the drug trafficking routes leading from the heroin laboratories in and around Afghanistan,
through Iran and the southern Iraqi city of Basra, and onwards to the Gulf States.
“We are tired of the crimes. There is no security.”
Young father
Baghdad, May 2008
According to the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) there are two main
drug smuggling routes through Iraq, as well as ongoing movements across the Saudi-Iraqi
border. A northern route sees drugs move into the country from Iran, then move through
Turkey and the Balkans to Western Europe. Drugs also move along a second southern route,
from Iran through the southern Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, into the Gulf States.
Iraq as a drug producing country
Iraq is no longer simply a transit country in the drug trade: since May 2007, opium poppy
cultivation has been seen throughout Iraq. Areas such as Diwaniya (central Iraq) and
Nassariyah (south-east), Dain’ya, Baldaruz, Sa’adiya and Khalis (east) were all identified as
having some poppy cultivation, indicating Iraq could be a potential new supplier in the
heroin market. Increased poppy cultivation inside Iraq is particularly worrying as it
increases the opportunities militant groups have to tap the illegal trade and profit more
substantially from the value chain of illegal drug production.
Instability is creating a criminalised environment
As in other post-conflict zones, illegal activities are prospering in Iraq’s ongoing vacuum
sustained by lawlessness, corruption and weak governmental institutions. Although drug
trafficking may still be only an emerging illegal activity in Iraq, the potential for
insurgent and militant groups to tap the illegal drug economy should not be
underestimated. This could result in a situation in which the illegal economy is not only
entrenched in the political and other sectors of society, but also offers almost unlimited
scope in terms of spill over to other (international) criminal and terrorist or insurgent
activities.
Economic development and job creation vital
With the instability in Iraq – as in Afghanistan and Somalia - creating a breeding ground
for organised crime, it is clear that the country’s security problems cannot be resolved by
military means alone. The lack of economic development and jobs is a public security
problem, and Iraq’s extensive unemployment problem must be urgently addressed, if only to
prevent young Iraqis from being drawn into organised criminal groups.
“The lack of jobs here is the main reason for the violence.”
